Africa Between the Rise of Trump and the War in Ukraine

Wither to, Africa?

By Seifudein Adem

(Research Fellow, JICA Ogata Research Institute for Peace and Development, Tokyo, Japan)

  (An earlier version of the essay was published in The Reporter (Ethiopia) on March 8, 2025.)

Although we deeply miss Ali Mazrui, who passed away in 2014, his remarkable insights and vibrant spirit remain with us, as we try to navigate a dynamic period in international relations. One can only imagine how his penetrating and comparative observations would illuminate the current events. It’s fascinating to think about how he might have interpreted the rapid and drastic changes that are taking place in our world today.  I wish to speak to two of these issues through Mazrui’s own voice: the rise of Trump and the war in Ukraine.

Ali Mazrui observed that the liberal international order, which he sometimes simply referred to as the Anglo-Saxon hegemony, might not possess the durability it seemed to have. He thoughtfully problematized the lasting nature (or lack thereof) of transnational norms, and above all, he most consistently and passionately, insisted that there was a missing agenda in the study of international relations – and that was the role of culture. Mazrui's ideas, articulated long before the rise of Donald Trump and the end of the Cold War, remind us of the power of his foresight.

Ali Mazrui would have been baffled by some of the domestic measures and foreign policies of President Donald Trump, especially so far in his second term. Mazrui would have first reminded us, as he had done in 1999, that social evolutionary theories have tended to see change as being in one, unilinear direction, and that historical materialism, too, saw the journey of humanity as a one-way ticket, with an assured destination of a more advanced society.  If so, then what is happening in the United States? Is Trump 2.0., the beginning of the journey back—a sort of evolution in reverse? Such questions make sense all the more given also the parallelism between the US administration’s recent political rhetoric on immigration and tariffs and what transpired in the late 19th century America. 

Mazrui would have compared Trump with Uganda’s Idi Amin, just like he had once compared Nikita Khrushchev with Idi Amin. Explaining some of the problems that arise when peasants become leaders of countries, in reference to Idi Amin, Mazrui said that such leaders tend to be among the least sensitized to international issues and are often the most obstinately parochial in their view of humanity. It may be argued that Trump also fits the bill. 

Mazrui went on to observe in 1974: “ldi Amin, like Nikita Khrushchev before him, has brought to the refined diplomatic AFFAIRS… the rustic embarrassment of inadequate inhibition. Like Russia’s Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950s and early 1960s, ldi Amin is today a peasant bull in the china shop of diplomacy.” Needless to say, here too, the broad similarity in the behaviors of Amin, Khrushchev and Trump is striking.

Mazrui thus elaborates further: “Khrushchev was capable of shouting loudly at another head of government or of taking off his shoe and banging it on the table at the United Nations. Amin was capable of sending a cable to Richard Nixon wishing him a speedy recovery from Watergate and another cable to (Israeli) Prime Minister Golda Meir telling her to pull up her knickers against the background of the October War in the Middle East in 1973.”

Of course, in our days, the tweeter has replaced the cable, but apart from that, l do not see a substantive difference between, the “diplomatic” styles of ldi Amin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Donald Trump.

It is also a remarkable, but random coincidence, that John Dean, the White House Counsel in the Nixon Administration, and one of the most prolific and sharpest critics of Donald Trump, had interviewed Mazrui in 1977. John Dean was then, about to launch his radio broadcast bearing the title, “The Right to Know”. But why did Dean decide to interview Mazrui, one might ask. In Mazrui’s (1989) own words, the reason was: “John Dean wanted to discuss ‘comparative presidential flaws’ …and he knew that l had been, in one way or another, associated with Idi Amin.”

But Mazrui would not have stopped just after comparing Idi Amin with Donald Trump. He would have also sought to explain something else. Why did Trump appeal to a plurality of Americans, given Trump’s obvious and many shortcomings? What is the “cause” of the Trump phenomenon? With his characteristic flamboyance, Mazrui (1967) would have probably said, something along the lines of: “There is a place for imagination in effective leadership. There is also a place for temporal congruity. What Trump lacked in [leadership qualities], he made up for by his visionary compatibility with the mood of America at a particular moment in time.”

My interpretation of Mazrui could be off the mark to some extent. But, I believe, he would have appreciated the opportunity to engage in a stimulating discussion, particularly about Trump’s policies, which are now widely viewed as illiberal both at home and abroad.

Now on Africa and the war in Ukraine. Mazrui said in 1980: “From the point of view of its impact on the relations between the Western alliance and [Russia], nuclear power has been liberating for the [Global South]watching from the sidelines. The major powers are now more afraid of war with one another than ever. This has helped to reduce gunboat diplomacy and territorial annexation. The old style of imperialism, in the sense of direct invasion by a great power to take over territory, seems to be receding into history.” 

Indeed, the fact that Putin’s adversaries had nuclear weapons, didn’t restrain him from invading and occupying Ukraine in February 2022. 

But, and more importantly, if Russia could engage in this way in “gunboat diplomacy and territorial annexation” in the middle of Europe and get away with it, what prevents it from doing the same outside Europe, should it wish to do so?

If Russia’s “gunboat diplomacy and territorial annexation” vis-à-vis Ukraine is allowed to stand, what would prevent any other country, in theory, from doing the same vis-a-vis its neighbors or others, should it wish to and could do so? Such an idea is not as outlandish as it appears, given Trump’s interest in annexation of Canada or acquisition of Greenland.  Could this lead to the snowball of imperial annexations — leading to the annexation of one area, as a defensive measure, to guard an area annexed before? This is a fair question to ask.

Ali Mazrui's interpretation of the relationship between nuclear weapons and great power behavior, therefore, seems to be less accurate. Or, is it possible that Mazrui’s own closeness in time to the disintegration of colonial empires affected his conception of change? 

In any case, the possibility of the return of the era of “gunboat diplomacy and territorial annexation " has more ominous implications for Africa since the borders of African states are notoriously more artificial and contested.

And yet, almost half of African countries, 25 African countries to be precise, did not support the 2022 UN resolution which basically condemned Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine. And the number of African countries, jumped from 25 to 33 two weeks ago when the same issue was voted on at the UN. And this, in my view, is a great paradox of Africa’s diplomacy today which would have also puzzled Ali Mazrui.  

In this instance, Mazrui would have asked: how does a continent so opposed to the revision of borders within Africa should, at the same time, be identified, as a tacit supporter of the same phenomenon elsewhere? Mazrui had indeed argued that the two most important moral principles African states would identify with is opposition to territorial annexation and opposition to racism.

The systemic change that is unfolding before our eyes is indeed quite drastic. But we will have to wait for the dust to settle before we can adequately comprehend the implications more fully.

Editor’s note:

We are witnessing a profound systemic shift in global politics, the full consequences of which remain uncertain. As always, Professor Seifudein Adem brings us closer to the towering intellect of the late Professor (Mwalimu) Ali Mazrui (RIP). The irony of this moment—and of the unsettling new world order—is that if Mwalimu were here, he might have seen the current American leadership under Trump as a regression. He would likely have drawn comparisons between Trump and two historical figures known for their erratic diplomacy and narrow worldviews: former Ugandan dictator Idi Amin (1925–2003) and former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971), Stalin’s successor. Professor Adem also tells us why Trump appeals to many Americans, arguing that his rhetoric aligns with a particular moment in the country’s mood, which reminds me of how our parents and grandparents danced in the streets of Uganda when Amin overthrew the Obote 1 government in 1971.

Regarding Africa’s stance on Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, I’m not sure whether Mwalimu Mazrui would have been surprised. For years, many African leaders have abandoned principles in favor of pragmatism, often embracing contradictions. In their meetings in Addis Ababa and at the regional level, they frequently align with authoritarian regimes, prioritizing political survival, economic interests, and strategic alliances over democratic values or a consistent foreign policy.

This reflects a broader trend where pragmatism takes precedence over principle—decisions are driven by immediate gains rather than long-term ideological commitments.

Nonetheless, Adem’s Sensei’s masterpiece is a strikingly accurate portrayal of the new world order—one that might have even surprised Professor Ali Mazrui himself.